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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
GAMING: Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
The Seminole Tribe of Florida (the Tribe) brought suit against the State of
Florida (the State) pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).'
The IGRA permits a tribe to sue a state in federal court in order to compel
good faith negotiations toward the formation of a gaming compact.2 The State
moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court. The district court denied the motion,3 but the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the Indian
Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the authority to abrogate state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.4 The Court also found that the doctrine
expounded in Ex parte Young' does not permit a tribe to compel good faith
negotiations by suing a state's governor.6
In a strongly divided opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' dismissal of the Tribe's suit. In doing so, the majority held that (1)
the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian
tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause,7 and (2) the doctrine of Ex parte Young may not be used
to enforce the IGRA against a state official.'
On the issue of immunity, the Court recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment presupposes that each state is a sovereign entity, and that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes individual lawsuits without a state's
consent.' The Court also recognized that Congress may abrogate a state's
immunity if it has "unequivocally expressed its intent" to do so, "pursuant to
a valid exercise of power."'" In the present case, Congress' intent to abrogate
the states' immunity from suit is "unmistakably clear."" On the other hand,
1. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
3. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. at 656.
4. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026 (11th Cir. 1994).
5. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, I1 F.3d at 1028.
7. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1122.
10. Id. at 1123 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
11. Id (quoting DelImuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)); see 25 U.S.C. §
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
the issue of Congress' authority to abrogate was explored more fully by the
Court.
The Court focused its analysis on the question of whether the IGRA was
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to
abrogate a state's immunity."2 The Court has recognized only two
constitutional provisions which grant Congress the authority to abrogate: the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 and, in a plurality opinion, the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 4 The Court found that the Indian Commerce Clause,
under which the applicable provisions of the IGRA were passed, is
indistinguishable from the Interstate Commerce Clause in the present case. 5
By doing so, the Court implicated the plurality opinion of Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,6 which recognizes Congress' authority, under the Interstate
Commerce Clause, to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. Rather than
attempt to distinguish the present case from Union Gas, the Court overturned
the earlier opinion, declaring it "wrongly decided."'1 Union Gas, the Court
found, had been proven to be a "solitary departure from established law."'"
Moreover, the rationale of Union Gas deviated from the Supreme Court's
established federalism jurisprudence, and the divided opinion caused confusion
in the lower courts. 9 The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
restricts federal judicial power under Article I of the Constitution, and that
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the limitations placed on federal
jurisdiction.'
In its second major holding, the Court determined that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young2 may not be used to enforce the applicable provision of the
IGRA against a state official.' The Ex parte Young doctrine allows a suit
against a state official to proceed, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment,
where the remedy sought is injunctive relief from a continuing violation of
federal law. The Court found that the intricate remedial scheme created by
the IGRA both defines and limits the duty that the Act imposes.' The IGRA
requires relatively modest sanctions against a state, culminating in the
Secretary of the Interior unilaterally imposing gaming regulations where an
2710(d)(7)(B) (1994).
12. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
13. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
14. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
15. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1127.
16. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
17. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
18. Id.
19. Id
20. Id at 1131.
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).






agreement cannot be reached through negotiation or mediation.' The Ex
parte Young doctrine, on the other hand, would expose a state official to the
full extent of a federal court's remedial powers, including contempt sanctions.
The availability of the Ex parte Young doctrine would enable a tribe to
circumvent the less strict remedial measures of the IGRA in favor of a court
imposed sanction against a state official. The Court, therefore, will not rewrite
the statutory enforcement scheme to "approximate what it thinks Congress
might have wanted had it known that [abrogation] was beyond its
authority."'
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized the effect of the majority
opinion in preventing Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad
range of actions He found the issue to be whether there was an implicit
bar to federal jurisdiction beyond that imposed by the Eleventh
Amendment.' Stevens explored the origins of the modem doctrine of state
sovereign immunity to determine that the majority is supported by little more
than speculation in its conclusion that "the Eleventh Amendment's express but
partial limitation on the scope of Article III reveals that an implicit but more
general limitation was already in place."'
Stevens cited the opinion in Hans v. Louisian?0 in support of the
conclusion that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was a common-law
rule that Congress had directed the federal courts to respect, not a
constitutional privilege that Congress could not displace by statute?' The
ruling in Hans, Stevens argued, was based on the fact that Congress had not
attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign
immunity' In the present case, he argued, Congress has expressed its intent
to overcome that presumption, and it has the clear authority to do so 3 The
doctrine of sovereign immunity, Stevens argued, "has nothing to do with the
limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment." Rather, it is
based on concerns of federalism and comity that "merit respect, but are...
subordinate to the plenary power of Congress."' Justice Stevens ended with
an unusually direct admonition of the majority opinion. "It may well follow
that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an
advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better reasoning in Justice
25. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
26. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
27. Id. at 1134.
28. I1. at 1137.
29. Id.
30. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
31. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. at 1137.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1138.
34. Id. at 1142.
No. 2]
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Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one
day."35
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join,
dissenting.
Justice Souter's dissent took Justice Steven's contention, that the majority
had elevated the common-law principle of sovereign immunity to
constitutional stature, and explored its implications in extraordinary detail. He
traced the historic development of the majority's repudiation of Union Gas
from the earliest days of our nation's founding. In doing so, he reached the
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment only limits federal jurisdiction in
cases of citizen-state diversity, not in cases where federal questions are
implicated.' On this point, he found no apparent disagreement in the
majority opinion. The implication of this point is that, since the plaintiffs in
the case at bar are citizens of the State that they are suing, the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to them.37 Therefore, Souter argued, the Court
must look elsewhere for the source of the immunity that the State cited.38
Souter argued that the source the majority found was the common-law
doctrine of state sovereign immunity, as it was wrongly promoted to the status
of constitutional law.39 Souter, like Stevens, contended that the Court in
Hans v. Louisiana had no occasion to consider whether Congress could
abrogate the common-law sovereign immunity by statute. Indeed, he argued,
that issue was not addressed until the Court decided in Union Gas that such
immunity had no constitutional status and was subject to abrogation.' The
Hans Court wrongly decided, it was argued, that the principle of sovereign
immunity derived from common law insulated a state from federal question
jurisdiction as to a suit from one of its own citizens.4 The majority's step of
constitutionalizing the Hans Court's holding merely compounded the mistake
and "takes its place with other historic examples of textually untethered
elevations of judicially derived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional
law. ,4
2
As to the issue of the doctrine of Ex parte Young, Souter found a separate
and dispositive basis for overturning the court of appeals dismissal. Souter
argued that the fact that a suit against a state official under the Ex parte
Young doctrine may have had a significant impact on state government did not
invalidate the doctrine's application.43 Souter explored the history of the
35. Id. at 1145.
36. id










doctrine, and defended it as more than mere judicial fiction." While he
recognized that, in theory, Congress may bar enforcement by suit even against
a state official, he did not find any clear statement of intent to displace the Ex
parte Young doctrine in the IGRA. Furthermore, he did not find that the
IGRA's "intricate remedial mechanisms" displaced the doctrine in the case at
bar. Therefore, he would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals!'
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
LAND ACQUISITION: Delegation Under the Indian Reorganization Act
South Dakota v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995)
In March 1990, the Lower Brule Tribe of Sioux Indians submitted an
application under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, asking the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire ninety-one acres of land in trust for the
purpose of industrial development.47 The land was partially within the City
of Oacoma, South Dakota.48 The City and State protested the acquisition to
the Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), who notified them
in March 1991 that the Tribe's application would be approved.49 On
subsequent appeal to the Interior Board of Indian Affairs, the BIA disclosed
that the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs had approved the application
in December 1990, without notifying the City or State.!" The Board then
dismissed the appeal, citing lack of jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
Assistant Secretary."' In July 1992, the City and State filed an action,'
seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.'
The City and State argued that the acquisition was invalid because 25
U.S.C. § 465 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.'
Alternatively, they argued (1) that the agency violated its own rules of
procedure, (2) that the Assistant Secretary acted beyond the scope of his
authority, and (3) that the approval was arbitrary and capricious.' The
44. Id. at 1180.
45. Id. at 1181.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994) ("The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, to acquire... any interest in lands ... within or without existing reservations... for
the purpose of providing land for Indians. Title to any lands or rights acquired... shall be taken
in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the
land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.").






53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
54. South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 880.
55. Id.
No. 2]
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Secretary moved to dismiss on the ground that an acquisition under 25 U.S.C.
§ 465 is "committed to agency discretion by law" and therefore is not subject
to judicial review.' The district court granted the Secretary's motion to
dismiss, concluding that 25 U.S.C. § 465 is not an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority because the statute identifies the agency to which
power is delegated and "clearly delineates the general policy to be applied and
the bounds of that delegated authority."'
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the City and State argued that 25 U.S.C.
§ 465 provides no legislative boundaries to control the Secretary's acquisition
of trust lands."8 The Secretary responded that the statutory purpose and
boundaries of the delegated power are sufficiently defined in the act.59 The
court of appeals held that 25 U.S.C. § 465 is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority, and reversed the decision of the district court.'
In reaching its conclusion, the court found that Congress, in enacting the
statute, did not "articulate and configure the underlying public use" that
justifies a trust acquisition.61 Although the legislative history of section 465
suggests that Congress did not intend to delegate unrestricted power to acquire
trust lands, the court determined that Congress failed to incorporate that
limited purpose into the act itself.' The court found that the agency received
this unconstitutional delegation, then used the lack of statutory control to
claim that its actions were beyond judicial review.' The court describes the
result as "an agency fiefdom whose boundaries were never established by
Congress, and whose unrestrained power is free of judicial review.""
The court cited a concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist, which
summarized the functions of the nondelegation doctrine.' First, the
nondelegation doctrine ensures that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress, to the extent consistent with orderly governmental
administration.' Second, the doctrine insures that Congress provides the
recipient of the delegated authority with an "intelligible principle" to guide the
exercise of discretion.67 Third, the doctrine insures that reviewing courts will
be able to test the exercise of discretion against ascertainable standards.'
56. IM.
57. Id
58. South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 881.
59. I
60. I at 885.
61. Id. at 883.
62. Id. at 884.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 885.
65. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86
(1980).






The court concluded that 25 U.S.C. § 465 failed all three of these criteria, and
was therefore invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional
authority.69
Murphy, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
On dissent, Judge Murphy argued that the court unnecessarily reached the
constitutional issue of delegation. Instead, the court should have focused on
the issue of the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the
Administrative Procedures Act." Even if the court had reason to address the
delegation issue, the dissent argued, the majority decision is inconsistent with
established nondelegation doctrine.7' Looking to the language of the statute,
its purpose and factual background, and the statutory context in which the
standards appear, the dissent concluded that 25 U.S.C. § 465 sufficiently
defined the scope of delegated authority to acquire trust lands for Indians
The majority, it was argued, departed from precedent by invalidating a statute
based on the broadest possible reading of its terms, and focusing on unlikely
hypothetical situations. By doing so, the court ignored the limiting effect
of the context in which the statute was passed.!4
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
CIVIL RIGHTS: Banishment
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2nd Cir. 1996)
In November and December 1991, a dispute arose on the Tonawanda
reservation. Petitioners, then members of the Tonawanda Band, accused
members of the Council of Chiefs, the principal lawmaking body of the Tribe,
of various misconduct. The allegations included misusing tribal funds,
suspension of tribal elections, excluding members of the Council from tribal
business, and burning of tribal records.!' Subsequently, Petitioners formed
an interim Council of the Tonawanda Band.76 In January 1992, Petitioners
were served with a notice of permanent banishment from Tribal land. The
notice stated that Petitioner's actions to "overthrow, or otherwise bring about
the removal of, the traditional government at the Tonawande Band of the
Seneca Nation, and further by becoming a member of the Interim General
Council [sic], are considered treason. Therefore banishment is required."'
Furthermore, Petitioners were advised that they were "stripped of [their]
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id. at 886.
72. Id. at 889.
73. Id. at 887.
74. Id
75. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877-78 (2nd Cir. 1996).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 878.
No. 2]
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Indian citizenship," and that they had lost all rights and privileges afforded
Tribal members."0
Petitioners brought suit in federal district court, claiming that the
banishment order amounted to a criminal conviction in violation of the rights
guaranteed under Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). They
sought writs of habeas corpus under the applicable ICRA provision." The
United States District Court for the Western District of New York concluded
that permanent banishment is not a sufficient restraint on liberty to trigger the
ICRA's habeas corpus provision. The Court dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction."'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the issue of whether
the habeas corpus provision of the ICRA "allows a federal court to review
punitive measures imposed by a tribe upon its members, when those measures
involve 'banishment' rather than imprisonment."' The Court concluded that
the district court erred in dismissing the petitions, and that the ICRA does
offer access to federal review in cases of banishment from the reservation.
8 3
Petitioners argued that the banishment orders were criminal sanctions and
reviewable under the ICRA. Respondents claimed that the orders were civil
in nature, and were merely "membership determinations," at the complete
discretion of the Tribe.' The Court accepted neither argument in full,
determining that, while the banishment orders constitute punitive sanctions for
allegedly criminal behavior, such a sanction is not itself sufficient to permit
a district court to hear an application for a writ of habeas corpus under the
ICRA.' The Court cited Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), in
concluding that a party seeking to invoke federal court jurisdiction under §
1303 of the ICRA must demonstrate "a severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty."' The court found that Petitioners sufficiently demonstrated such
restraint on liberty in the case at bar, and therefore, the district court
improperly dismissed the applications for writs of habeas corpus.
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined permanent banishment as a
restraint on liberty. The Court noted that physical custody is no longer the
only criterion by which federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is determined."
Furthermore, the Court noted, "restraint" does not require ongoing supervision
78. Id.
79. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).






86. Id at 880.
87. Id.




or prior approval.' In light of these facts, the "coerced and peremptory
deprivation of the petitioner's membership in the tribe and their social and
cultural affiliation" satisfied the Court's understanding of a sufficient restraint
on liberty.'
Having concluded that the petitions should be considered on the merits, the
Court then found that the Tribe itself was not a proper defendant in the case
at bar.9 The Court concluded that nothing in the ICRA subjects tribes to
federal court jurisdiction in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief.'
Furthermore, since the respondent in a habeas corpus action is an individual
.custodian, the court cannot imply a general waiver of the Tribe's sovereign
immunity.'
Jacobs, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The dissenting judge did not find the issue to be whether Petitioners would
suffer impairments of liberties enjoyed by other tribal members, but rather,
whether they would suffer impairments of liberties enjoyed by the American
public at large." He concluded that Petitioner's constitutional rights, as
American citizens, would not be impaired by their banishment from Tribal
lands. Therefore, Petitioners did not demonstrate a severe restraint on any
liberty that the writ of habeas corpus could protect. 5 The dissent agreed with
the majority view that the Tribe was not a proper party to the action.'
89. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 899.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 902.
95. Id. at 901.
96. Id.
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